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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3580 
___________ 
 
MANUEL LAMPON-PAZ, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-16-cv-05052) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
September 20, 2016 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 26, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Manuel Lampon-Paz appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint against the Commissioner of Social Security.  We will affirm. 
 Lampon-Paz filed a complaint alleging that the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”) has unreasonably delayed its adjudication of his application for disability 
benefits.  In particular, he alleged that he filed a claim for benefits in September 2015, 
that the SSA denied it in November 2015, and that he filed an administrative appeal.  He 
further alleged that the SSA refused to expedite his appeal and advised him that it could 
take approximately one year to resolve it.  Lampon-Paz sought an order requiring the 
SSA to rule on his application “immediately.”  His specific prayer for relief was for an 
order directing the SSA to “grant me my benefits immediately or give reason as to why 
not.” 
 The District Court dismissed Lampon-Paz’s complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  The District Court reasoned that § 405(g) 
authorizes review only of the SSA’s “final decision” and that the SSA’s decision not to 
expedite Lampon-Paz’s appeal is not a “final decision” within the meaning of that statute.  
We agree that the District Court lacked § 405(g) jurisdiction over Lampon-Paz’s 
complaint because his administrative proceeding is not final.  See Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 
148 F.3d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).  For the same reason, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to the extent that Lampon-Paz sought an order directing the SSA to actually 
grant his application and pay him benefits.  See id.   
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 The District Court, however, did not consider other potential grounds for 
jurisdiction over Lampon-Paz’s request for an order directing the SSA merely to decide 
his appeal.  One such potential ground suggested by that request would be mandamus 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361.   
 The Supreme Court has declined to decide whether District Courts may exercise 
mandamus jurisdiction in Social Security cases.  See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 
616 (1984).  But we have exercised mandamus jurisdiction in Social Security cases in 
other contexts, see Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 431, 437 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1983), and at least one other court has held that District Courts may exercise mandamus 
jurisdiction to remedy unreasonable delays by the SSA in resolving claims for benefits, 
see White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Fitzgerald, 148 F.3d 
at 235 (noting that a District Court, in the absence of a final SSA decision, “may well 
have had jurisdiction” over a claim that the SSA’s delay violated due process).   
 Even if the District Court had mandamus jurisdiction, however, mandamus relief 
was not warranted on the merits.  See Ringer, 466 U.S. at 616-17 (holding that 
mandamus was not appropriate on the merits without deciding existence of mandamus 
jurisdiction).  “[A] writ of mandamus . . . represents an extraordinary remedy” and “a 
drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.”  Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 
229, 251 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).   
 In this case, Lampon-Paz complains of the SSA’s nine-month delay in deciding 
his administrative appeal.  That delay falls far short of the delays in adjudicating benefits 
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that courts have found problematic in other cases.  See, e.g., Littlefield v. Heckler, 824 
F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim based on a nine-month delay and collecting 
cases granting relief on the basis of an almost four-year delay but denying relief on the 
basis of delays of, inter alia, 19 months and two years).   
 Thus, there is no reason to remand for the District Court to consider the possibility 
of exercising mandamus jurisdiction in this case because mandamus clearly is not 
warranted on the merits.  We express no opinion on whether the District Court could have 
exercised mandamus jurisdiction in this situation.  We also express no opinion on 
whether some longer period of delay, consistent with the authority noted above, might 
warrant mandamus relief in the future. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Lampon-
Paz’s motion for expedited review is granted to the extent that we have resolved this 
appeal within the time-frame he requested.   
